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Melrose

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Everything posted by Melrose

  1. So the Tennessean article is written very oddly, it seems to double back on itself a few times. In any event, when the central lobby opens on 1/24, is a central TSA checkpoint opening as well? Or will TSA remain split into two checkpoints, one for A/B and one for C/D, until some later date in 2023? Likewise, will the connector between A/B and C/D after TSA security remain closed until a later date, or is that connection also part of what is opening on 1/24?
  2. Are there any renderings around of what the ground level with the rental car counters is going to look like upon completion? At the moment, there is the one escalator/staircase on each side going down from baggage claim level, and then you arrive down on ground level with those somewhat low ceilings, but of course the entire central section still has temporary walls. There has been plenty of visibility of the renderings of what the main hall up above will look like, trying to get a sense of what the end game is down on that ground level and then what final connectivity will look like from that ground level to the two Terminal Garages.
  3. Another scenario not covered under this Lease is generally about other event cancellations. You can see the projected types of speedway events and number of events on page 17 of the financial review report: https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Financial-Review-Nashville-Fairgrounds-Speedway-Renovation-221108.pdf?ct=1667947830 If any other speedway events are rained out, delayed, or cancelled, and then there is a resulting shortfall on ticket tax collections or concessions from those events (the financial review already says Bristol's revenue projections are too high) then the Metro General Fund is on the hook for that bond service shortfall, Bristol is not at all.
  4. .The article is not correct in just copying the Mayor's press release, and neither are these statements. The Lease Agreement absolutely does not have Bristol covering full debt deficits/shortfalls. Here's a link, see Section 3(c): https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Metro-Bristol-Motor-Speedway-Nashville-Fairgrounds-Lease-221108.pdf?ct=1667947760 There is a provision for a "contingent rent" payment, which is only triggered under limited circumstances and is only for a partial payment amount well short of the full debt service, absolutely not the full debt payment (other than possibly in the first year only and that isn't even entirely clear). These partial payment requirements will also allow Bristol to "game" the scheduling; if they can make more money holding the race at another SMI track, then they will just be able to take the contingent rent hit, and Metro will be the one that loses out. Further, see the Development Agreement, which is quite clear that the Metro General Fund is backstopping the bond debt (see Exhibit H): https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Metro-BMS-Development-Agreement-Nashville-Fairgrounds-Speedway-221108.pdf?ct=1667947875 In short, this is not like the soccer deal at all.
  5. The search function is not cooperating with me, how far away is the Hilton from topping out?
  6. Well, it's not just $34 Million, it's $34 Million (the $17 M from NVC, it should be noted is ultimately Nashville tax dollars, since that is how NVC receives most of its funds), PLUS up to $100 Million in Revenue Bonds. That deal summary sheet omits the amount off the revenue bonds because they want to downplay the total price. If you look at the financial review from May, it models an estimated $97 Million in revenue bonds needed. That amount could go down just a bit as NVC is kicking in more money now or could stay the same since construction costs continue to rise. https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Financial-Review-Nashville-Fairgrounds-Speedway-Renovation-221108.pdf?ct=1667947830 The review is a very interesting read, but this conclusion on Page 37 is particularly notable: "Based on these projections, it is likely that Metro would exhaust its debt service reserve funds and require the use of General Funds to meet its financial obligations."
  7. Following up on this, VSG now saying very clearly that all their report did was check the costing of the Titans’ proposed preferred renovation. So again no confirmation or analysis at all that the obligated renovation would cost $1.8 B or updating of their 2017 study that found renovations would cost $300 Million. The Mayor and Titans claiming this report was something it was not is not pretty bad. https://www.nashvillescene.com/news/pithinthewind/city-whiffs-on-determining-nissan-stadium-liability/article_501e165e-5bb9-11ed-adc4-7f85a99719c0.html
  8. But, if the East Bank is Nashville's "next great neighborhood" or neighborhoods, then that would mean the residents there will be paying the healthy portion. If the bachelorettes are paying, that means the East Bank is just going to be an extension of lower Broadway. Funny how these pro- new stadium arguments seem to keep getting in the way of themselves...
  9. Let's do this once again. There is the 2017 VSG study, which came before the new stadium scam was conceived, and thus is the most honest assessment of renovation needs. It said $300 Million . From there you have the Titans' 2021 PROPOSAL for their preferred renovation stating it would cost $1.8 Billion. And then you have the latest VSG report, which many smart people are pointing out, is not an actual renovation need assessment, but rather is just a review of the Titans' proposal. Here's a thread going further on this: https://twitter.com/jc_bradbury/status/1587798333913006082?s=20&t=jR254DU8m__ex7VkiTHedg Again the Titans and you can certainly believe a new stadium is preferred over a renovation, but saying it is preferred because it has been "shown" that an obligated renovation (not the Titans' platinum edition proposal will definitely cost $1.8 Billion or even $1+ Billion) and thus that is very close in cost to the new stadium's supposed cost (which does not include future upkeep costs, infrastructure, etc) is not true.
  10. The full VSG study on the purported cost to renovate Nissan Stadium is out: https://www.nashville.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Venue-Solutions-Group-Report-10.31.22.pdf?ct=1667310341 Digging in on the details, but this guiding statement stands out right away : "In our estimate, we have tried to capture the costs needed to a) renovate and update the facility to keep it running for another 20 years, b) brining up to NFL standards, and c) provide new features to make the facility competitive for hosting major events and making it the “go-to” spot overlooking downtown Nashville." Everyone can debate what the current Nissan Stadium lease means when it requires "a modern, first class, open air, stadium designed primarily for football, with a grass playing surface, to be located on the Stadium Site," but the Nissan Stadium Lease definitely does NOT obligate the City to "provide new features to make the facility competitive for hosting major events and making it the “go-to” spot overlooking downtown Nashville." Certainly some folks may think the City should do this with a renovation, and that's a completely fine opinion, but it looks like this $1.8 Billion "obligated renovation" estimate very well includes costs to renovate Nissan Stadium over and above what is obligated. So just for the purposes of the argument that "Well, it's gonna cost the same to do the obligated renovation versus build a new stadium" that argument looks more complicated because the actual "obligated renovation cost" (and not the dream renovation cost to make it Super Bowl ready) appears likely to be something less.
  11. Yeah, that ship has sailed insofar as trying to have it both ways on picking when the East Bank development “is” a part of the stadium deal and “is not” when it is inconvenient for the Mayor’s talking points.
  12. Facts are one-note? As pointed out, in Mendes' post, this is not correct. I think Council should work to make it reality though and that would go a very long way to making this deal better. The Titans should fun the Capital Repair Reserve Fund and the surplus fund from their pockets, taxes shouldn't fund these first.
  13. I am curious why the 6 units on the Villa Pl. side are only two stories, seems they will end up being quite small. Don't know why they didn't just have them all go 3 stories like the 4 units on Edgehill.
  14. Some sober analysis from Bob Mendes: https://www.mendesfornashville.com/news/first-pass-thru-stadium-term-sheet Some of the most interesting observations by Mendes, many of which point out that the true public contribution for this stadium is larger than is being peddled : - "The public tax dollar revenue streams are being designed to pay not only Metro’s $760 million share of the Stadium Site construction costs, but also to fund long-term capital repairs for the new stadium decades into the future. After making annual construction cost bond payments, public tax dollars will be used to fund a “Capital Repair Reserve Fund” in an amount to be decided in the future. (pages 12, 17, 18) Since the cost to update the current stadium is alleged to be $1.8 billion, we can assume that the Capital Repair Reserve Fund will be very large. In addition to this fund, the term sheet contemplates an additional “surplus fund” that will be at least 20% of the currently undefined Capital Repair Reserve Fund. (page 13)" - ..."the 20 acre Stadium Village. Again, there is no image that shows the exact location. The term sheet does not describe a cost to build the Stadium Village or who will pay for that. (page 20) This looks to be a topic for future negotiations." - "For the larger 105 acre Campus area, the term sheet describes substantial but undefined costs for Metro. The term sheet requires Metro to provide 2,000 parking spaces. (page 20) This cost is NOT included in the $2.1 billion Stadium Site construction costs. If these spaces are provided in structured parking decks, I would estimate the cost to be no less than $25,000 per spot — or at least $50 million of addition cost to Metro. The team would keep all of the revenue from these 2,000 parking spaces for all events held in the new stadium. (page 20)" - "The term sheet says that the team would have three 5-year renewal options at the end of a 30 year lease. Since a major part of Metro’s current situation is due to the team having unilateral lease renewal options, I don’t like the idea of signing up again for the team having unilateral renewal terms. (page 14)" - "On balance, I see the cost to Metro in the non-binding term sheet as: $760 million in revenue bonds for construction, Funding Capital Repair Reserve Fund with tax dollars (amount unknown), Funding surplus fund with tax dollars (minimum of 20% of the unknown Capital Repair Reserve Fund), Continued $4 million per year Water Department payment-in-lieu-of-taxes for some period of time, Unknown cost related to Stadium Village, Cost of 2,000 parking spaces (I project to be at least $50 million), and Cost of Campus Infrastructure (amount unknown)." - "Finally, I want to emphasize that after two years of private negotiations behind closed doors, the team and the Mayor’s Office have brought us a non-binding term sheet for the purpose of “facilitating ongoing discussions.” The public and the Council should engage meaningfully to understand where they are in the process…but we shouldn’t be hurried."
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