John Thacker

Interesting article. Always hard to know who was bluffing or not in the negotiations. Interesting demonstration of the power of the purse as well. Another takeaway is that the threats by the new Congress to take away the money if not signed also helped drive the negotiations and the sense of urgency. Today was the deadline for submitting applications for the $2.4B. I'd assume that NCDOT simply updated the previous application and is asking for everything in the previous 5th Frequency and the SEHSR application, but haven't seen anything official.

There was $43 million for station improvements already, and $20 million for the locomotive and coach overhaul for the midday train, so that's most of the difference.

Actually, that's not quite right, according to the planning documents (http://www.sehsr.org...y/chapter6.html), while the Silver Star almost certainly will be routed through the S-Line, it would actually slow down the Silver Meteor slightly to route it on the S-line without substantial upgrades of the S-line south of Raleigh. They didn't even consider routing down the S-line to Raleigh and then going along the NCRR to Selma, as that circuitous route would end up be slowing than either just going down the A-line or S-line, just as the Silver Star is slow now, even with the speed ups on a 110mph S-line from Raleigh to Petersburg. The Silver Star will be as fast to Savannah as the Silver Meteor or Silver Palm on their optimal routes.

Exactly. Also, the FRA wants to put only NS, not CSX, on the hook if the projected on-time numbers for the passenger trains don't materialize as projected. The sticking point is NS vs. the FRA. NCDOT, understandably, is a lot more willing to compromise with NS than the FRA, to avoid missing out on that federal money. They had similar delays in WA, but WSDOT, BNSF, and the FRA eventually came to an agreement. The S-line is still key to the entire project's viability; under NCDOT's projections, completing only the Raleigh to Charlotte portions just means greater operating losses. That Tier II EIS can't come soon enough.

It's not clear that the fundamental issue is between NCDOT and NS, rather than with the FRA and the other parties. CSX isn't involved because the current money is only for the Raleigh-Charlotte portion, which is all NS (and NCRR track leased to NS). CSX would be involved in the negotiations for to acquire the S-line between Richmond and Raleigh. NCDOT negotiated an agreement with NS, but the FRA has to ratify it and has so far refused. They've been having three-way negotiations. The sticking point is that most of the money is for capacity improvements that are supposed to reduce delays. The FRA wants NS to agree to pay certain penalties if the percentage of passenger trains that get delayed exceed various metrics; NS doesn't like the numbers that the FRA is insisting on. The FRA doesn't want NS and other freight operators to get all the benefits of spending the money, instead of it flowing mostly to passenger trains, and wants to ensure that the passenger trains benefit to the levels promised by NCDOT to the feds. NS doesn't want to end up losing money and possibly effective freight capacity from all this work being done; if that happens, NS would be happier just vetoing the deal. NCDOT would be happy to get the federal money either way, and would still be happy if it ended up making the state's freight railroads better, so NCDOT isn't nearly as inclined to push a hard bargain with NS as the FRA is. There's probably room for a deal to be signed (especially with the clock ticking). The N&O article is a little misleading when it says that "The added stimulus funds sought by North Carolina would cut nearly another hour, boosting the average speed to 86 mph between Raleigh and Charlotte." Not with the current money awarded, no, but if we got the entire $6 billion wishlist then maybe. However, we won't right now, especially since the Tier II EIS isn't done. That also relies on NS giving approval to raise MAS (Maximum Authorized Speed) to 90mph; currently they're saying not over 79mph until there are *no* at-grade intersections (railroad crosses without overpasses).

Looks like Florida is rejecting their money as well, based on three reasons: Potential for cost overruns that would be borne solely by the stateOptimistic ridership projectionsIf they do build it but the operating costs are too high and they shut it down, having to return all the federal money I still feel like SEHSR should be in the running, but it's even more of a shame that the EIS still isn't completed.

Even if the NCRR operated the freight, it will still face the same fundamental problem-- the freight rail is profitable, the passenger services not (until SESHR is completed, according to projections), and it's difficult to optimize both track and operations for freight and passenger services simultaneously. NCRR would have the same concerns about disrupting the profitable freight operations that pay for the track upgrades if operating directly.It's a pretty crazy situation with the FRA and the funds, especially because North Carolina and NCRR have been able to reach agreement with NS until the FRA stepped in. Perhaps Congressional threats to take away the money will get the FRA to approve those agreements faster.I see that in response to Obama's call for more HSR money, Rep. Bill Shuster (R-PA, chair of the railroad subcommittee of the House Transportation Committee) is saying the same thing that Rep. John Mica (R-FL, chair of House Transportation Committee) has been saying, that the money should be spent on the NEC, not scattered throughout the country on projects with questionable return. From here: "“To spend the money across the country in dribs and drabs is not going to do it,” U.S. Representative Bill Shuster, the Pennsylvania Republican who chairs the railroad subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said in a phone interview. “I’m not willing to spend money unless we know it is going to be targeted on the one corridor where it could seriously have an impact, and that’s the Northeast Corridor.”"

Well, it's not entirely the Administration's fault, it's also the fault of the Administration's party in Congress, which wrote the bills. The restriction on commuter service was explicitly contained in the stimulus law. There wasn't a majority in Congress for "use a bunch of federal money raised from taxes nationwide to build the best HSR network wherever it may be." Plenty of people, even those considering themselves rail advocates, wanted to make sure that their state had a "fair shot" at the money. This was especially since people viewed it as a "stimulus" law, so they wanted to put the money to use in their own state rather than stimulate elsewhere. Other people intentionally wanted to use the money to try to seed various projects, without giving the projects enough to be fully built out, in the hope that this would force hands later and get people to finish the job regardless of cost. And then you also had the people that really, really wanted to spend money on "true" HSR, even where it only marginally makes sense (like FL), instead of highly rated upgrades that didn't have as exciting top speeds. And it turned out that when the feds didn't require any matching funds, that states would throw out plans that they would never choose to fund themselves because it was "free" money, whereas North Carolina has a long and steady history of the state spending money on improvements. There's a small handful of Republicans like John Mica (new House Transportation Committee chair) that would be willing to fund HSR in sensible places like the Northeast Corridor, but voted against the bill for funding it in poor places. However, the Administration, probably rightly, estimated that any such votes gained by focusing the money on the right places (plus extra votes from Republicans located in those rail-friendly areas) would be outweighed by Democrats voting against the bill if their state wasn't going to get anything. You can see one report from America 2050 of their estimation of where it makes sense to build rail. Unsurprisingly, the NEC and California routes that include either LA or SF rank highest. DC to Richmond ranks very well, as does Seattle to Portland. FL ranks poorly, as does the now canceled Midwest routes. Building CA HSR only out in the Central Valley is very poor; I suppose one idea is that they'll link up to Riverside, LA, and San Diego eventually, but it would be better to start with something that works first. Apparently the new FL governor is waiting for a feasibility study and considering returning their money as well. If so, hopefully NC and VA would actually get some of the reallocated money this time. It would also mean that the worst, least viable projects would all be canceled (except for the silly idea of starting the CA HSR in the wrong place.)

Actually, the ARC tunnel was ineligible for HSIPR funds. If you look at its Record of Decision (linked), it was approved by the Federal Transit Administration, not the Federal Railroad Administration. If you read the FRA guidelines (linked) for applying for the money, you'll note this: The ARC tunnel's environmental and planning documents indicated that commuter rail was the primary intended beneficiary; hence, it was ineligible for funds under the HSIPR program administered by the FRA. It could only apply for Federal Transit Administration funds, and had already done so. This was a problem more generally for the Northeast-- most states in the area have been more interested in the Northeast Corridor from a local commuter rail than intercity rail (often to other states, since so many of the states are small geographically) perspective, so they didn't have as much environmental work on the shelf that was intercity focused. And any documentation that played up the commuter rail benefit would end up leading to an FRA rejection.The regulation isn't entirely pointless-- it is partially to prevent the same project from being funded by both agencies, ending up being overfunded at the expense of other projects. Now, if the ARC tunnel had been included as part of a larger corridor-wide application, that could have been intercity rail focused. But as a single project, all its documentation was commuter rail (transit) focused, which was a problem for the FRA and the HSIPR funds, under the stimulus law and the budget. All just reinforces my earlier points about how working the regulations and the contracting system was so important.

They do, but if you look at their document for NEC upgrades, they still haven't done the Environmental Impact Statements and other planning documents. You can't understand how the HSR money was awarded without understanding the planning process. It takes 7-10 years to do a one or two tier EIS for a major project.The money had to spent well within that time frame, for many reasons, including the legislation specifying, the Administration wanted it to start before the end of the term, and the general desire for "shovel ready" projects-- it isn't much of a stimulus to a recession if you spend it 8 years later.The programs that got funding were programs with big EISes for large corridors completed or almost completed.The NEC just didn't qualify. It didn't matter if Amtrak or states had asked for money as in that document, nothing could have been spent until 7 or 10 years of NEPA-required planning was done.

To be fair, the reason that the NEC didn't get much is that states didn't really apply. And states didn't really apply because states didn't have Environmental Impact Statements sitting around for projects waiting to be funded, and the Feds made it clear that they wanted to fund some projects that could get started before Obama's term was up, not fund projects that wouldn't break ground until a (possibly two-tier) EIS was done in 8 to 10 years. The Feds also made it clear that they had a strong bias in favor of funding "true" high speed rail, even where that means funding fast trains in areas that won't be profitable, like in FL, or funding an entirely useless set of tracks that will set idle until ten times as much money is spent, like in California (where the first set of tracks is going from Borden through Fresno to Corcoran, and won't be used at all until far more tracks are built. (I'd much rather they spend money on Anaheim or San Diego to LA, or something in NorCal, or anything that actually has incremental value and would build support.) Apparently the gambit is working for CA in a sense, as a big part of the reason that the Feds are giving CA more money is so that the initial tracks will actually make it to Bakersfield and thus connect two cities people have at least heard of. The plans still don't include electrification, rail cars, or the passing tracks that will eventually be needed. Florida also got a lot because Florida had funded a high speed rail authority that produced an EIS and costs for building rail. The state and state's voters looked at the cost and decided that they didn't want to pay for it, so they put it on the shelf a few years ago. When the federal monies became available, they pulled it off the shelf and submitted it. So they had a plan ready to go. VA was hurt by not having extensive planning documentation. NC was hurt by not having the Tier II EIS for the Richmond to Raleigh portion done. Yeah, the Charlotte upgrades are nice, but you sell SEHSR based on the Richmond-Raleigh link up to the NEC. Still, I'd rather have seen North Carolina rewarded more for actually investing in rail over the last ten years, being willing to put her own money into it instead of waiting for federal funds alone. And for the project actually being profitable and useful. (The Ohio plan that just lost its money only predicted an average speed of 38.4 mph, according to their application.)

No, all the studies performed so far have suggested that it wouldn't be an efficient use of money on any NC or VA line because ridership wouldn't increase nearly enough to pay for it. The SEHSR website has a discussion of this listed in its FAQ. It could happen in the future if conditions warrant, but it's not worth doing now at the expense of other priorities. I agree that DC to Richmond/Petersburg improvements should be a high priority especially until the Tier II EIS gets its ROD. Restoring the S-line from Raleigh to Petersburg saves sixty to ninety minutes just from taking a shorter path, not counting the improvements from having a fully grade separated upgraded track there. Linking up with the NEC is the real game-changer, and it's what's capable of selling the upgrades as a truly interstate and viable (and profitable) project that's a good use of federal money. The WI and OH governor-elects are doing the right thing for the country, in the end. Those projects are *not* as good uses of federal money as SEHSR (or certain other projects like NEC upgrades, potentially things I'm less familiar with like CA.) As the SEHSR FAQ says: The money was allocated because of politics, in an attempt to buy support throughout the country.

There's no chance of getting money for the Raleigh station before the planning moves further along. Due to NEPA and the rules for using federal money, a lot of awards are conditioned on what has plans and environmental documentation and approvals ready to go, not what makes the most sense from a larger perspective. Hopefully that oft-delayed final Tier II EIS for SEHSR will come out mid 2011 as currently promised, and we'll get a Record of Decision. The Charlotte upgrades are nice (but expensive), but the real synergies for the project come with linking up to the Northeast Corridor.

The new House Transportation Committee chairman Rep. John Mica (R-FL) is relatively pro-rail (especially for a Republican), but he's been an enormous critic of the HSR selections made so far, because he thinks that money should be going to areas with high density that can support rail-- specifically the NEC but possibly also CA. He's been very down on the Midwestern and other grants that he thinks are wasting lots of money for incremental upgrades routes that still won't be competitive with rail-- and he puts the Orlando to Tampa route in his own state in that same basket, though he thinks a "Orlando Airport to the theme parks" HSR would be profitable. He has spoken favorably in the past of upgrading a connection from the NEC down the East Coast to Florida, though. What that means for NC is SEHSR really needs to sell the point of the synergy of connecting into the NEC. Remember that the SEHSR documents don't really show the Raleigh to Charlotte line being profitable until the full SEHSR is restored with the S-line and the service on it. Nor do the Raleigh to Charlotte upgrades look on the surface like they're providing a lot of bang for the buck, either. Sure, those capacity improvements are necessary, but compared to the speed increases for the state-funded improvements it doesn't have the wow factor. The trains are 35+ minutes faster since 2001 with the state spending on low-hanging fruit, but the $600+ million in federal spending doesn't seem to outside observers like it's getting that much. What we need to sell is the fact that once the full SEHSR is up and running, it's more profitable than any of the other HSR corridors (outside the NEC), according to the FRA. Give us all that Ohio and Wisconsin money, and instead of spending money on three or four money-losing routes, the Feds will have invested in one profitable route. North Carolina also needs to sell the point that the state has been willing to put its own money on the line for improvements in a way that other states have not. A lot of those states talking about returning money are the ones that only applied for "free" Phase I money, where no match was required.

Sure, but as I said, the Scientific St. and Oakdale Ave grade separations actually are on the Prioritized Capital plan for a cost of $3.5 and $5 million respectively (and actually costing less in incremental dollars because of the $2 million in federal dollars available for a grade separation), and despite the Cox-Hoskins double track being added to those very intersections, NCDOT and NCRR didn't do the grade separations. Given that precedent, I think it's unlikely to expect that any grade separations not in the prioritized capital plan be performed right now.

Oh, I agree that the Morrisville-Carpenter/Aviation Parkway/NC54 intersection is crazy complicated, but note that in the service development plan track charts NCDOT didn't think that leaving it alone (after last year's changes) would prevent 79mph service, and don't have it marked for a future separation. I just think it's unlikely, then. After all, when doing the Cox-Hoskins Greensboro-High Point double-tracking, they didn't do the Oakdale Ave and Scientific Street grade separations and curve straightening in Jamestown (which are on the SEHSR capital plan in the last category, unlike Morrisville-Carpenter) at the same time, even while adding the second main track to those crossings. And those changes are necessary to raise from 65mph to 79mph. And there are other sorely needed grade separations on the track charts, like the two times Ellis Road in Durham crosses the tracks. The western crossing is even worse, because it's in the siding between the D&S Junction and the East Durham rail yard, making for absolutely ridiculous train movements and blockages. It's nice to do it right, but I think that the incremental upgrade strategy has been pretty effective for NCDOT and NCRR over the last decade, in contrast to those states waiting for the perfect storm of funding.

That's true, but at the same time if you look at the original project master list from August 24, 2009, the ACWR project is actually at the top of the list for the 5h Piedmont frequency list. (Well, getting the ROW for the ACWR project is first, relocation is third.) The argument against it is that in that same more detailed list, the actual relocation of the ACWR has a later time by which the NEPA documentation would be done. It's also possible that the FRA simply copied that "8 grade crossings closed" from the ACWR relocation and the entire application package, even if the money isn't sufficient to get to that part. They can say that it's a "phase" towards that. Certainly the FRA hasn't been stopped in the past from touting speed and other benefits beyond what will actually be accomplished with the current money. (Especially when planning is involved; someone who didn't realize what was going on might think that some of these planning projects would actually achieve some of the benefits that they're just figuring out the EIS and PE for.) Speaking of low priority, the Fetner-Clegg double tracking was the absolutely last item on the prioritized capital plan. I guess perhaps it's more important to the NCRR for freight and possible commuter rail than it is to NCDOT for SEHSR, but it's still interesting that they (according to reports here) chose to fund that first, over some of the Greensboro to Durham H line double tracking mentioned under the 5th frequency section.

I can't imagine the Crescent disappearing when: 1) Virginia just started funding a Lynchburg to DC and beyond train that uses the Crescent tracks, there are towns in Virginia that would want to maintain service, and 2) The Crescent will still be plenty fast for getting from DC to Greensboro and points south, because it's just a straighter path. Right now Washington Union Station to Greensboro is scheduled regularly 7:32 on the Carolinian but 5:45 on the Crescent. Even a fully built out SEHSR will be roughly 5 hours for DC to Greensboro-- the Crescent will be closer in travel time to the SEHSR than the Carolinian is to the Crescent right now. The Greensboro to Charlotte improvements will help the Crescent as well, too. What I would expect is that some times change under a built out SEHSR. The Silver Star will undoubtedly take the restored S-line to save an hour or two in travel time itself, and I would expect the time savings to be used to make the station times more convenient for Columbia, SC and less so for Raleigh (what with all the other SEHSR trains going Raleigh to DC)

Maybe. But what about project 31a and b, the 7th item, listed as CRISP Northend Phase I, which is about acquiring the ROW to move the ACWR connecting track from Tryon to Graham, and then relocating it? "CRISP Northend Phase I - Relocate ACWR connecting track in Charlotte and close 8 atgrade crossings." That's only a $17.6 million project, and closes 8 at grade crossings. The $22 million could be for that and some of the other Charlotte area improvements.